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Abstract
We model an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two
alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a
trade-o¤ between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce
the scope for learning on existing technologies. A con‡ict is shown to arise
between the young and the old, because the former favor innovation while
the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction between di¤erent gener-
ations and short-lived policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem,
where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby
either for the maintainance of the current technology or the adoption of
a new one. By focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we charac-
terize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying
technological parameters.
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1. Introduction
“the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less
developed, the image of its own future” (Karl Marx)
As pointed out by Lucas (1988) in his breath-taking manifesto, one the great-
est challenges to economic thinking is to understand the origins of large interna-
tional income di¤erences, the reason being that such wide di¤erences - of factor
30-40 between the tails of the per capita income levels distribution - seem to sig-
nal the existence of huge unexploited possibilities for improving human welfare.
A decade after, even if our understanding has made important steps forward,
the challenge is still there (Prescott, 1998). On the one side, neoclassical growth
theory has driven our attention to international di¤erences in the stocks of pro-
ductive factors. However, simple growth accounting exercises show that di¤er-
ences in such stocks could explain di¤erences in per capita income levels only
if investment in intangible assets (e.g. human and organizational capital) were
implausibly large - in some instances, as large as GDP. On the other side, new
growth theory has stressed the role of international di¤erences in endogenously
accumulated stocks of usable knowledge as signalled by di¤erences in total fac-
tor productivities. However, this perspective clashes with the observed absence
of clear national biases in international absolute labor productivities across sec-
tors: after all, if workers in one country were better educated or had better work
practices than workers in another country, the former should be more productive
than the latter in all sectors. Therefore, di¤erences in the stocks of factors and
of usable knowledge provide only a partial explanation of international income
discrepancies.
Prescott (1998) argues that, in order to complete the explanation, it is not us-
able knowledge in itself that has to be considered but rather the amount of usable
knowledge that is actually used. Total factor productivities di¤er because coun-
tries di¤er in terms of their ability to adopt or fully exploit newer and newer avail-
able technologies, or what Kindleberger (1962) calls “the capacity to transform”.
Because new technology adoption induces structural changes whose acceptance
requires to trade o¤ short term adjustment sacri…ces against long term e¢ciency
gains, the capacity to transform is largely determined by the composition of ‘pro-
gressive’ and ‘conservative’ con‡icting interests (“the clash between progress and
security”, Fisher, 1935). Under this perspective, the wealth of nations comes
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to depend on the e¢cacy of institutional interest intermediation processes that
lead to national decision making. This vision is strongly supported by historical
evidence (Olson, 1982; Gilpin 1987; Mokyr, 1990). A classical example of the
failure of institutional interest intermediation is the inertial explanation of the
decline of Great Britain as the world hegemonic economic power towards the end
of the nineteenth century: “Britain was caught in a set of ideological traps. All
the strategies available to her were blocked o¤ in one way or another” (Lewis,
1978). The vision is also broadly consistent with evidence coming from interna-
tional sectorial analyses (e.g., Clark, 1987; Baily, 1993; Wolcott, 1994; Baily and
Gersbach, 1995) and business-oriented case studies which point out how ideolog-
ical traps may oppose the development of …rms ‘competitive advantage’ through
technological upgrading (Porter, 1990).
Our aim is to investigate how ideological traps blocking the adoption of new
technologies may arise from unbalanced interest representation as well as short-
sighted decision making and, thus, to suggest that international di¤erences in total
factor productivity may be linked to international discrepancies in the mechanics
of political intermediation between conservative and progressive interests.
To capture in a simple way such a clash between conservative and progressive
interests, we model an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two
alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-
o¤ between the two insofar as frequent technological updates reduce the scope
for learning on existing technologies. A con‡ict is shown to arise between the
young and the old, because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer
learning. Under this respect, the economics of the paper is much in the spirit of
Krusell and Rìos-Rull’s (1996) path-breaking contribution based on the vintage
human capital model of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). However, in order to make
our point as clear as possible, we use the streamlined version of that work as
presented by Aghion and Howitt (1998). The idea is simple. At each point in
time there is an incumbent vintage of an aggregate technology. Such a vintage
can either be still improvable or obsolete. In the former case, learning-by-doing
can enhance its productivity, in the latter the scope for learning is exhausted.
Also at each point in time there is a new vintage, which is freely available and,
if adopted, becomes more productive than the old one only after some running
in. This initial productivity gap is the more severe the less learning has taken
place on the previous vintage. Therefore, there is a trade-o¤ between innovation
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and learning-by-doing, which creates a potential con‡ict of interests between the
young and the old who, due to their di¤erent life horizons, tend to favor innovation
and learning by doing respectively.
A more signi…cant departure from the existing literature is made in terms
of interest intermediation. Both Krusell and Rìos-Rull (1996) and Aghion and
Howitt (1998) assume that the intergenerational con‡ict is handled by democratic
voting so that the interests of the larger generation prevail. While an enlighten-
ing …rst step, this approach is unsatisfactory for two main reasons. First, when
technological change is involved, public intervention usually takes the form of
government regulation in areas such as product and security standards, environ-
mental policy, restrictions on entry, and trade barriers, which are the realm of
organized interest group action rather than of democratic voting (Viscusi, Vernon
and Harrington, 1993). Second, by attributing an overwhelming role to demo-
graphic factors, democracy somehow obscures the underlying economic stances.1
For both reasons, we model an alternative mechanism of interest intermediation,
based on the action of organized interest groups, that will be shown to yield a
resolution of the intergenerational con‡ict in which economic factors play a rel-
evant role. In so doing, we build on the ideas of Olson (1965) who argues that
what matters for the success of special interest groups are the relative surpluses
that they are able to generate for their members, rather than their relative demo-
graphic sizes. His insights have been recently formalized in terms of a common
agency set-up where, in the wake of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), competing
interest groups (principals) lobby an incumbent policy maker (agent) in order to
in‡uence her decisions (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Dixit, Grossman
and Helpman, 1997; Grossman and Helpman, 1998).2 The policy maker knows
the e¢cient decision to make for the living generations, but she is assumed to
trade o¤ aggregate welfare against special interests.
While our work is deeply rooted in the common agency approach to politics,
we depart from its standard implementation under one major respect that brings
1From an empirical point of view, this feature may also clash with the insigni…cance of
demographic variables often found in growth regressions (Levine and Renelt, 1992).
2See also the elegant foundation by Grossman and Helpman (1996) who introduce lobbies in
a democratic environment where competing ideologically oriented parties use campaign contri-
butions from aligned groups of voters in order to win seats in parliament. Such contributions
are spent to in‡uence the voting behavior of uninformed (not aligned) citizens.
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us back to the original menu auction of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). We
like to think of our regulator (auctioneer) as being uninformed and with no per-
sonal preferences over alternative policy choices. Moreover, her decision making
is (possibly slightly) costly so that inertia is the policy outcome in the absence of
any external stimulus. Interest groups (bidders) understand the potential role of
their activities (menus of o¤ers) in fostering the implementation of their favorite
policies and are willing to use resources to make themselves heard. The strengths
of their competing e¤orts transmit their private information to the policy maker.
In our simple framework, this means that competing generations invest a certain
amount of resources in supporting either the maintenance of the current vintage
technology or the adoption of the new one. In doing so, they expect the policy
maker to implement the alternative, whose support absorbs the larger amount
of resources. Therefore, our characterization of special interest politics is essen-
tially di¤erent from the one based on in‡uence/campaign driven contributions
(Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982; Becker, 1983; Snyder, 1990) even
in its recent common agency formulation and it is closer to the idea of informa-
tional lobbying (Banks and Weingast, 1992; Ainsworth, 1993; Austen-Smith and
Wright, 1992 and 1994; Lohmann, 1995), which views interest groups as sources
of information for imperfectly informed politicians.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1998), political myopia is embedded in the
model by assuming that regulators stand in o¢ce for one period only. This leads
to the characterization of the mechanics of interest intermediation in each mo-
ment as a menu auction game between a one-period-lived auctioneer and two
overlapping generations of bidders. We are not aware of any study of such a
game and even related results are scarce. Bergemann and Välimäki (1998a) an-
alyze a repeated common agency game with imperfect observability. They also
investigate a dynamic common agency game with in…nitely-lived players and pro-
pose the Truthful Markov Equilibrium concept that we also adopt (Bergemann
and Välimäki, 1998b). Grossman and Helpman (1998) characterize the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium of a common agency game in which there are overlapping
generations but only the older is exogenously assumed to act as an active prin-
cipal. Moreover, while their policy space is continuous, our technology adoption
choice is inherently binary. This discrete feature will be shown to give rise to
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endogenous lobby formation.3
By assuming for simplicity that auctioneers maximize total bids and perfect
information on the side of the bidders (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986), we are
able to show that, …rst, the winner of the auction is the interest group that is
able to generate the larger relative surplus for its members independently from its
size. Second, because of perfect information, the expected loser does not organize
any collective action. Third, the winner’s e¤ort absorbs an amount of resources
which is equal to the relative surplus that the losing group would obtain were
it to chose the policy (second-price) so that, provided that existing generations
have free access to the lobbying process, the outcome is e¢cient from their point
of view. This result, which is a corollary of well-known properties of auctions (Ri-
ley and Samuelson, 1981; Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Wolfstetter, 1996), is
reminiscent of the e¢ciency argument by Wittman (1989) who sustains that com-
peting uninformed political entrepreneurs have all the incentives to discover and
exploit unknown political demands. Fourth, the identity of the winner depends
crucially on the underlying economic parameters. Fifth, a cycle which involves
periods of stagnation being followed by periods of technological change may arise
endogenously from the competing actions of organized interest groups. Sixth,
such economic cycle is accompanied by an endogenous political cycle of lobbies
formation. Seventh, because policy makers are short-lived and living generations
do not take into account the impact of their choices on all future generations,
in general the political outcome is dynamically ine¢cient from the point of view
of future generations. Therefore, unbalanced interest representation and short-
sighted decision making lead to ine¢cient technological trajectories.
The implication of our analysis is that international income di¤erences could
be traced back to more or less severe problems of interest representation and policy
makers’ planning horizons. Interestingly enough, since, due to more contained
free rider problems and incumbent advantages, more concentrated and better-
established interests are likely to face substantially lower costs of collective action
than more di¤use and recent ones (Olson, 1965; Bendor and Mookerjee, 1987),
our analysis also suggests that extended democratic mandates can be interpreted
as a ‘second-best’ political solution that sacri…ces some information about the
personal intensities of citizens’ preferences (‘intensive information’) in favor of
3Nonetheless, as Grossman and Helpman (1998), we assume away the problem that free riding
creates to the organization of collective action (Olson, 1965).
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wider participation to the policy making process (‘extensive information’) (Dahl,
1994).
The remainder of the paper consists of four additional sections. The …rst
introduces the model. After presenting the political equilibrium concept, the
second solves the model and comments on the e¢ciency of the policy outcome.
The third studies the emergence of endogenous economic and political cycles in
relation to the underlying parameters. The fourth concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Economics
Consider an overlapping generations framework consisting of agents who live for
two periods only. At any moment in time two generations are alive: the old
O and the young Y with lifetime horizons of one and two periods respectively.
Population grows at a costant rate n.
Each generation is made of homogeneous agents. At birth the lifetime prefer-
ences of the representative agent born at time t are represented by the following
intertemporal utility function:
ut = ctt + ½c
t
t+1 (2.1)
where cts is consumption at time s of the agent born at t and ½ 2 (0; 1) is the
discount factor.
Independently from their generation, all agents supply inelastically one unit
of the sole factor of production, say labor L, which is employed to produce a
unique consumption good X under constant returns to scale. At any point in
time per-capita output is given by:
xt = ¸A
® (2.2)
where xt is the output share of each individual alive at time t, and ¸A® is labor
productivity. The …nal good cannot be stored and there are no capital markets.
Thus, in each period and for each generation, consumption equals disposable
income.
Labor productivity improves in time due to process innovation. Progress
comes in the form of new vintages ® of technology. Each vintage induces an
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improvement of size A 2 (1; 1). However, the full exploitation of a new vintage
technology requires learning-by doing. In particular, we assume that learning
takes one period so that ¸ 2 (0; 1) when the new vintage is introduced and ¸ = 1
after one period. Moreover, part of the learning obtained on the old vintage spills
over to the new vintage: ¸ = ¸ if learning-by-doing did not occur on the old
vintage, and ¸ = ¸ > ¸ if it occurred.
Accordingly, when deciding whether to substitute the existing vintage ® with
the new vintage ®+1, agents may face a trade-o¤ between the productivity gains
of learning-by-doing and those of process innovation. In particular, this is the
case if:
¸A < 1 < ¸A (2.3)
The existence of a trade-o¤ between innovation and learning-by-doing creates
a potential intergenerational con‡ict. The old, who will not be there next period,
may prefer the current productivity gains arising from learning on the existing
vintage. On the contrary, the young, who will be alive next period, may like
to trade such gains for future productivity improvements stemming from current
innovation.
2.2. Politics
Innovation policy is the outcome of a process of interest intermediation by public
regulators. Regulators are assumed to be short-lived in that they remain in charge
for one period only and they are all identical (Grossman and Helpman, 1998). On
the one hand, they have no inherent preferences about policies and are a priori
unaware of the existence as well as the potential of new vintages so that, when
left alone, they maintain the status quo technology. On the other hand, they can
be forced into action by special interests.
We model the mechanism of interest intermediation as a common agency
game. Each generation has the opportunity of getting organized as a pressure
group in order to in‡uence the regulator’s decision through collective activities.
These activities may materialize in support demonstrations or in various sorts of
direct and indirect side-payments to the incumbent regulator, such as bribes and
campaign contributions. Due to coordination problems, such collective activities
absorb resources. Only if a pressure group spends a positive amount of resources,
the regulator is able to hear its voice. The e¢cacies of collective activities depends
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only on the amount of resources spent and neither the identity nor the size of the
corresponding interest group. This amounts to assuming, …rst, that the ‘pressure-
formation function’, which maps a group’s lobbying expenditures into regulator’s
payo¤, exhibits constant returns to scale as well as unitary unit input coe¢cient
and, second, that the regulator’s payo¤ is a simple sum of groups’ collective
expenditures.
The speci…c mechanism we consider is a …rst-price menu-auction game (Bern-
heim and Whinston, 1986) in which each period t the regulator selects an action
and each lobby of the living cohorts o¤ers a menu of contributions contingent on
the action chosen. The lobbies pay their announced contributions for the allo-
cation ultimately chosen by the regulator and this choice is made to maximize
the regulator’s payo¤, given the menus of o¤ers announced. A complication with
respect to the original set-up by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) comes from the
fact that, in choosing their contributions at time t, the young must look ahead
to period t + 1. This is because they will still be around and their future con-
sumption will be a¤ected by both the policy adopted and the contributions paid
at that time.
In principle, this game has a potentially large set of equilibria. To limit their
number, we restrict our attention to Nash equilibria which are both ‘truthful’,
in that the corresponding contributions correctly re‡ect relative preferences for
the various alternatives and Markov-perfect in that, in a stationary environment,
expected policies are not only self-ful…lling but also depend only on the values of
the state variable expected at that time (Krusell and Rìos-Rull, 1996).4
Speci…cally, we extend the common agency model of Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) to a dynamic setting. In each period there are three players: an agent
(the regulator) and two principals (the lobbies of the currently young and old).
Players are short-lived. The regulator lives one period only and so does the lobby
of the currently old. The lobby of the currently young becomes next period old
lobby. Therefore, we have a dynamic common agency set-up with one-period-lived
agents and overlapping generations of principals.5
4Truthful Nash equilibria are appealing because they are the only Nash equilibria that are
stable when nonbinding communication is possible. Moreover, as we will see, they have strong
e¢ciency properties.
5Short-lived agents and overlapping generations of principals di¤erentiate our extension from
the dynamic common agency game with in…nitely lived players studied by Bergemann and
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Time is discrete and is denoted by t = 0; 1; ::; 1. The lobbies are indexed
by i 2 I = fY;Og. In each period the regulator can select an action (policy)
pt 2 P 2 fI;Ng where I and N stand respectively for ‘innovation’ and ‘no
innovation’. Each lobby o¤ers a reward scheme (contribution) ri(pt; zt) 2 R2+
which depends on the history zt and the action pt chosen by the regulator in
period t. Let rt ´ (rO(I; zt); rO(N; zt); rY (I; zt); rY (N; zt)) be the list of lobbies’
contributions in period t, p ´ (p0; :::; pt; :::) be the list of policies chosen in each
period and r ´ (r0; :::; rt; :::) be the list of the lists of lobbies’ contributions in
each period.
The history of the game in period t is zt ´ (p0; :::; pt¡1; r0; :::; rt¡1) and Zt is
the set of all possible t period histories. The future in period t is the sequence of
future actions (pt; rt) = (pt+1; :::; rt+1; :::). We denote by Z(zt) the set of all pos-
sible histories zt+1 which are accessible from history zt, and analogously Z(pt; zt)
the set of all possible histories zt+1 generated by zt and pt. Both actions I and N
can be implemented by the regulator at no cost and no inherent personal bene…t.
On the contrary, they are not indi¤erent to the lobbies. The instantaneous ‡ow
bene…t of regulator’s action pt to lobby i is vi(pt; zt).
A reward strategy for lobby i is a mapping ri : P £ Zt ! R2+ which assigns
to every possible action pt 2 P of the regulator a nonnegative reward contingent
on the past history of the game. A strategy for the regulator is an action p :
R2+ £ Zt ! P which depends on the aggregate reward in period t.
With history zt the expected payo¤ for the regulator of an action pt is the
total reward raised: rO(pt; zt) + rY (pt; zt). The expected payo¤ for the old lobby
is the current ‡ow bene…t net of the regulator’s reward:
nO(pt; zt) ´ vO(pt; zt) ¡ rO(pt; zt)
while the expected payo¤ of the young lobby also includes the expected next-
period ‡ow bene…t V (pt; zt) if in period t the action was pt and history was zt:
nY (pt; zt) ´ vY (pt; zt) ¡ rY (pt; zt) + ½V (pt; zt)
To reduce the number of potential equilibria, we restrict our attention to
strategies that in any period t do not depend on the entire history of the game
zt, but only on the previous period regulator’s action pt¡1 (Markov strategies)
Välimäki (1998).
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and that in addition are ‘truthful’ (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Bergemann
and Välimäki, 1998b). Notice that the previous period regulator’s action is the
”natural” choice as the state variable of the economy, since current payo¤s (and
therefore current actions) depend crucially on whether in the previous period
there was a technological change or not.
De…nition 1. A markovian reward strategy ri(pt; pt¡1) for lobby i is said to be
truthful with respect to (ep; pt¡1) if and only if for all pt 2 P, either
(i) ni(pt; pt¡1) = ni(ep; pt¡1)
or
(ii) ni(pt; pt¡1) < ni(ep; pt¡1), and ri(pt; pt¡1) = 0.
Accordingly, we propose the following recursive de…nition of the equilibrium
of our dynamic political common agency game:
De…nition 2. The strategies r¤O(pt; pt¡1), r
¤
Y (pt; pt¡1) and p
¤(r(:); pt¡1) form a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in truthful strategies if and only if:
(i) for all pt¡1 and all r(:), p¤(r(:); pt¡1) is a solution to
max
pt2P
frO(pt; pt¡1) + rY (pt; pt¡1)g
(ii) for all pt¡1, there is no other reward function brO(pt; pt¡1) such that
nO(bpt; pt¡1) > nO(p¤t ; pt¡1)
where p¤ and bp are best response actions to (r¤O(:); r¤Y (:)) and (brO(:); r¤Y (:)) re-
spectively.
(iii) for all pt¡1, there is no other reward function rY (pt; pt¡1) such that
nY (pt; pt¡1) > nY (p
¤
t ; pt¡1)
where p¤ and p are best response actions to (r¤O(:); r
¤
Y (:)) and (r
¤
O(:); rY (:)) re-
spectively.
(iv) r¤O(:) and r¤Y (:) are truthful strategies with respect to p¤(:).
3. The political equilibrium
Operationally, the characterization of the set of truthful equilibria requires the
evaluation of the young lobby’s next-period expected bene…t V (pt; zt). Such eval-
uation can be done by following De…nition 2, which implies that the two di¤erent
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triples of players, who are active in two di¤erent periods t1 and t2, will take the
same equilibrium actions when confronted with the same history pt1¡1 = pt2¡1.
This restricts the set of candidate equilibria to those entailing only four alterna-
tive patterns of technological change (pt; pt¡1) 2 f(I; I); (N; I); (I;N); (N;N)g.
The following result applies:
Proposition 1. Assume ¸A > ¸ and de…ne Rit = rit=A¯ where ¯ =
Pt
s=0 Fswith




¤) = [0; (1¡¸A); I] when pt¡1 = I and (R¤Ot; R¤Y t; p¤) = [0; "; I]











¸A(1 + A½) ¡ 1 ¡ ½¸A; 0;N¤ when pt¡1 = I and (R¤Ot; R¤Y t; p¤) =
[0; "; I] when pt¡1 = N is the only MPE in truthful strategies if and only if:
(1 ¡ ¸A)








¤) = [0; 0;N ] when pt¡1 = I and (R¤Ot; R
¤
Y t; p
¤) = [0; "; I]
when pt¡1 = N is the only MPE in truthful strategies if and only if:
½ <
(1 ¡ ¸A)
A(¸A ¡ ¸) (3.3)
Proof. The game is a …rst-price menu auction where the winner pays the second-
highest bid (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). First, we can rule out candidates
for equilibrium where both O and Y contribute. If both lobbies want the same
policy, only one will contribute an in…nitely small amount ". This is what is
meant by R¤Ot = 0 and R
¤
Y t = ". On the other hand, if their interests con‡ict,
only the winning lobby contributes, while the other, realizing that it cannot win,
does not contribute at all.
Second, we can rule out candidates for equilibrium with pt = N when pt¡1 =
N , the reason being that, when the current state is N , both groups bene…t from
innovation. Thus, all equilibria, must have pt = I whenever pt¡1 = N .
Third, pt = I with only Y contributing is the equilibrium outcome when
pt¡1 = I if and only if [vY (I; I) + ½VY (I; I)]¡[vY (N; I) + ½VY (N; I)] > vO(N; I)¡
vO(I; I) > 0. This explains condition (3.1).
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Fourth, pt = N with only O contributing is the equilibrium outcome when
pt¡1 = I if and only if vO(N; I)¡vO(I; I) > [vY (I; I) + ½VY (I; I)]¡[vY (N; I) + ½VY (N; I)] >
0. This explains condition (3.2).
Fifth, pt = N with neither group contributing is the equilibrium outcome
when pt¡1 = I if vO(N; I)¡vO(I; I) > [vY (N; I) + ½VY (N; I)]¡[vY (I; I) + ½VY (I; I)] >
0. This explains (3.3).
In other words, there are three alternative MPE in truthful strategies depend-
ing on parameter values. In one equilibrium, which occurs when condition (3.1)
is satis…ed, innovation takes place at every point in time and learning-by-doing
never takes place. When (3.1) holds, restless technological update is sustained by
the organized collective action of the young. In a second equilibrium, which oc-
curs when condition (3.2) is satis…ed, a period of technological update is followed
by a period of stagnation and viceversa. Growth alternatively relies on innovation
and learning-by-doing. When (3.2) holds, technological change is blocked every
second period by the organized collective action of the old. The same kind of
technological cycle characterizes the third equilibrium, which occurs when con-
dition (3.3) is satis…ed. The di¤erence with respect to the previous case is that,
when (3.3) holds, technological change is triggered every second period by the or-
ganized collective action of either lobby. In any case, in both the second and third
equilibria, technological change is accompanied by endogenous cycles of lobbies’
formation.
It is worthwhile noticing that, because strategies are truthful, the MPE entails
the step-wise maximization of lobbies’ welfare. However, the MPE will be gen-
erally ine¢cient from a dynamic point of view due to the fact that short-sighted
regulators and overlapping generations’ lobbies do not take into account that cur-
rent technological choices a¤ect future regulators’ payo¤ and future generations’
welfare. As shown by Bergemann and Välimäki (1998b) dynamic e¢ciency of
dynamic common agency games requires in…nite planning horizons.
4. Comparative statics
In this section, we study how the political equilibria that we characterized in
Proposition 1 depend on the subjective discount factor ½, on the rate of growth
of population n and on the technological parameters ¸, ¸ and A. To derive our
results, we will focus on the relevant trade-o¤ faced by di¤erent generations in
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their choice of lobbying for the implementation of a new technology versus the
continuation of the existing one.
As we discussed in the previous section, only strategies and actions when the
history of the game is I need to be analyzed. In the other case, when previous
period action was N , the only possible equilibrium policy is to innovate, which is
the preferred policy of both lobbies. More speci…cally, we will study if, following
a change in the above parameters, the political equilibrium where technologi-
cal change occurs in every period is more or less likely to occur relative to the
equilibrium cycle, where periods of innovations and periods of technological rest
alternate.
First of all, we will now argue that when the intertemporal discount rate
decreases, equilibrium cycles where periods of technological innovations follow
periods of stagnation are more likely to occur. Assume that the state of the
game is I. If innovation takes place in the current and in the next period, the
discounted value of next period bene…t for the young is given by ½¸A®+2: If
instead, no innovation occurs in the current period (and obviously innovation
does take place in the next one), the discounted value of next period bene…t is
given by ½¸A®+1. Given our assumptions, ½
¡
¸A ¡ ¸¢ > 0 so that the higher is ½
the more likely that the young will lobby for continuous innovations.
Let us now consider how the equilibrium changes when the degree of positive
externality from the learning by doing on the old technology to the productivity
of the new technology changes. This positive externality is represented by the
parameter ¸: Intuitively, when ¸ increases (decreases), it should be less (more)
likely that agents choose to innovate in every period. By looking at condition
(3.1) (which is the necessary and su¢cient condition for innovation to arise in
every period), we can easily see that this is indeed the case.
When ¸ changes, future productivity gains that are independent from the full
exploitation of current technology change as well. If ¸ increases (and therefore
future productivity gains also increase), we would expect agents to …nd continuous
technological innovation relatively more attractive. Again, inspection of condition
(3.1) shows that this anticipation is correct. Finally, notice that the changes in
the parameter A are economically similar to changes in ¸. Thus, their e¤ects on
the equilibrium can be explained in the same way.
To conclude, changes in the rate of population growth n a¤ects the politico-
economic equilibrium because they alter the relative size of the lobbies. The
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higher is n the larger is the lobby of the young and the larger is their aggre-
gate contribution relative to the contribution of the old. Thus, the equilibrium
with continuous innovations is more likely to arise when the rate of growth of
population is high.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed a model where the interaction between organized
special interests and the policy makers generates a political equilibrium which
involves either continuous process innovations or periods of technological change
followed by periods of stagnation (i.e. technological cycles). The prevailing equi-
librium depends on technological and preference parameters, and not only on the
demographic structure of the population as it happens in ‘democratic’ models.
More speci…cally, equilibrium technological cycles are likely to arise when agents
put little value on future consumption, when the positive externality on future
productivity gains of current learning-by-doing is high and when the future pro-
ductivity gains that do not depend on the full exploitation of current technology
are low. In any case, technological change is accompanied by endogenous cycles of
lobbies’ formation and, because the interests of future generations are not taken
into account, it will be generally ine¢cient from a dynamic point of view. Inter-
national income di¤erences could be traced back to more or less severe problems
of interest representation and policy makers’ planning horizons.
References
[1] Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory (Cambridge
(Mass.): MIT Press).
[2] Ainsworth, S. (1993) Regulating lobbyists and interest groups in‡uence,
Journal of Politics 55, 41-56.
[3] Austen-Smith, D. and J.R. Wright (1992) Competitive lobbying for a legis-
lator’s vote, Social Choice and Welfare 9, 229-257.
[4] Austen-Smith, D. and J.R. Wright (1994) Counteractive lobbying, American
Journal of Political Science 38, 25-44.
15
[5] Bailey, M.N. (1993) Competition, regulation, and the e¢ciency in service
industries, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 71-130.
[6] Bailey, M.N. and H. Gersbach (1995) E¢ciency in manufacturing and the
need for global competition, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 307-
347.
[7] Banks, J. and B.R. Weingast (1992) The political control of bureaucracies
under asymmetric information, American Journal of Political Science 36,
509-524.
[8] Becker, G.S. (1983) A theory of competition among pressure groups for po-
litical in‡uence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371-400.
[9] Bendor, J. and D. Mookherjee (1987) Institutional structure and the logic of
ongoing collective action, American Political Science Review 81, 129-154.
[10] Bergemann, D. and J. Välimäki (1998a) Repeated Common Agency and
Imperfect Observability, mimeo, Northwestern and Yale University.
[11] Bergemann, D. and J. Välimäki (1998b) Dynamic Common Agency, Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper No.1206, Yale University.
[12] Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston (1986) Menu auctions, resource alloca-
tion, and economic in‡uence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31.
[13] Bhagwati, J.N. (1982) Directly unproductive, pro…t-seeking (DUP) activi-
ties, Journal of Political Economy 90, 988-1002.
[14] Chari, V.V. and H. Hopenhayn (1991) Vintage human capital, growth and
the di¤usion of new technology, Journal of Political Economy 99, 1142-1165.
[15] Dahl, R.A. (1994) A democratic dilemma: System e¤ectiveness and citizen
participation, Political Science Quarterly 109, 23-34.
[16] Dixit, A.K., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997) Common agency and
coordination: General theory and application to government policy making,
Journal of Political Economy 105, 753-769.
[17] Fisher, A. (1935) The Clash of Progress and Security (London: Macmillan).
16
[18] Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press).
[19] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994) Protection for sale, American Eco-
nomic Review 84, 833-850.
[20] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1996) Electoral competition and special
interest politics, Review of Economic Studies 63, 265-286.
[21] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1998) Intergenerational distribution and
short-lived governments, Economic Journal 108, 1299-1329.
[22] Kindleberger, C.P. (1962) Foreign Trade and the National Economy (New
Haven: Yale University Press).
[23] Krueger, A. (1974) The political economy of the rent-seeking society, Amer-
ican Economic Review 64, 291-303
[24] Krusell, P., and J.-V. Rìos-Rull (1996) Vested interests in a positive theory
of stagnation and growth, Review of Economic Studies 63, 301-329.
[25] Krusell, P., V. Quadrini and J.-V. Rìos-Rull (1997) Politico-economic equi-
librium and economic growth, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
21, 243-272.
[26] Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992) A sensitivity analysis of cross country growth
regressions, American Economic Review 82, 942-963.
[27] Lewis, A. (1978) Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-1913 (London: George
Allen and Unwin).
[28] Lohman, S. (1995) Information, access and contributions: A signaling model
of lobbying, Public Choice 85, 267-284.
[29] Mokyr, J. (1990) The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Eco-
nomic Progress (New York: Oxford University Press).
[30] Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the The-
ory of Groups (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press).
[31] Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations - Economic Growth,
Stag‡ation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press)
17
[32] Porter, M.E. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations (London:
Macmillan Press).
[33] Prescott, E.C. (1998) Needed: A theory of total factor productivity, Inter-
national Economic Review 39, 525-551.
[34] Riley, J.G. and W.F. Samuelson (1981) Optimal auctions, American Eco-
nomic Review 71, 381-392.
[35] Snyder, J.M. (1991) On buying legislatures, Economics and Politics 3, 93-
109.
[36] Tullock, G. (1967) The welfare costs of tari¤s, monopolies and theft, Western
Economic Journal 5, 224-232.
[37] Viscusi, W.K., Vernon, J.V. and J.E. Harrington (1993) Economics of Reg-
ulation and Antitrust (D.C. Heath and Company).
[38] Wittman, D. (1989) Why democracies produce e¢cient results, Journal of
Political Economy 97, 1395-1424.
[39] Wolfstetter, E. (1996) Auctions: An Introduction, Journal of Economic Sur-
veys 10, 367-420.
18
